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A. 
The constitutionality control in Greece1 is perhaps an interesting 
subject for a German academic. Although Greece is a small 
country in the south of the European continent, it does not follow 
the European system of the constitutionality control. On the 
contrary, the Greek legal order follows the American system. 
There is a historical explanation for that and I am going to ana-
lyze later why Greece follows the American system. 
But let us begin with the basics: First of all, in Greece there is 
no Constitutional Court. The “Bundesverfassungsgericht” does 
not exist in Greece. On the contrary, it is written in our Consti-
tution that every court, even that of first instance, has the right 
and the duty to control the constitutionality of laws. Conse-
quently, Greece follows the American system. Of course, the 
US Supreme Court plays a very significant role concerning the 
interpretation of the Constitution, but, literally speaking, it is not 
a Constitutional Court. The US Supreme Court is designed to 
decide over the major “hard” cases and not to control the con-
stitutionality of the laws, as is the case with the Constitutional 
Courts in Europe. 
                                                   
1  For an introduction to the constitutionality control in Greece, see 
Epaminondas Spiliotopoulos, Judicial Review of Legislative Acts in 
Greece, Temp. L.Q. 56 (1983), pp. 463-502; Wassilios Skouris, Con-
stitutional Disputes and Judicial Review in Greece, in: Christine 
Landfried (ed.), Constitutional Review and Legislation, Baden-Baden, 
Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1989, pp. 177-200; Prodromos Dag-
toglou, Die Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit in Griechenland, in: Christian 
Starck, Albrecht Weber (Hrsg.), Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit in 
Westeuropa, Teilband I: Berichte, Baden-Baden, Nomos Ver-
lagsgesellschaft, 1986, pp. 363 et seq.; Philippos C. Spyropoulos, 
Theodore Fortsakis, Constitutional Law in Greece, Wolters Kluwer In-
ternational-Ant. N. Sakkoulas, 2009, pp. 206-207. 
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B. 
After these introductory remarks, let us now come to the basic 
characteristics of the Greek legal order and of the Greek system 
of constitutionality control. In Greece, there are three Highest 
Courts: The Areopag (Ários págos in ancient Greek), the high-
est court for criminal and civil cases (the equivalent to the Bun-
desgerichtshof), then, the Council of State as the highest court 
for administrative cases (the equivalent to the Bundesverwal-
tungsgericht) and last, the Court of Audit (the equivalent to the 
Bundesfinanzhof). 
The Areopag is the oldest highest court founded in the 19th cen-
tury, whereas the Council of State was founded in 1929. Al-
ready from the 1870’s, the Areopag under the obvious influence 
of the jurisprudence of the US Supreme Court (see the famous 
decision Marbury v. Madison), exercised the constitutionality 
control. Actually, Greece was one of the first European coun-
tries which controlled the constitutionality of the law provisions. 
At that time, in the majority of the European countries, there was 
no distinction between constitutional and under-constitutional 
law. In other words, in the 19th century, the European legal the-
ory and jurisprudence were not familiar with the notion of the 
superiority of constitutional law and, at that time, there were no 
Constitutional Courts. That is why it is very important that the 
Areopag followed the constitutionality control and the American 
system. 
Since the 1870’s, the constitutionality control became a consti-
tutional custom. Every court controlled the constitutionality of 
laws. The constitutionality control by every court as a constitu-
tional custom lasted until 1927. In 1927, for the first time, the 
Greek Constitution explicitly established that the courts have 
the duty to control the constitutionality of laws. So, in 1927, the 
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custom of constitutionality control became a written constitu-
tional provision. 
This is the historical dimension. The crucial question is why this 
system of constitutionality control still exists today in Greece 
and why there is no Constitutional Court, contrary to the major-
ity of European countries. The explanation has to do with the 
Greek constitutional history. Greece suffered from a dictator-
ship from 1967 until 1974. For the first time in the Greek legal 
history a constitutional court was introduced in the so-called 
“Constitution” (there is no real constitution during a military dic-
tatorship) of 1968. Today, many Greek lawyers still believe that 
we should not introduce a constitutional court in Greece be-
cause this is an influence of the dictatorship of the military junta 
between 1967 and 1974. 
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C. 
The constitutionality control is guaranteed in two Articles of the 
Greek Constitution. The first one is Art. 93 § 4 and the second 
is Art. 87 § 2. According to these provisions, every court should 
control the constitutionality of the laws and safeguard the appli-
cation of the Constitution. Concerning the basic characteristics 
and the fundamental features of the constitutionality control in 
Greece, the first question which arises is that of time: The con-
stitutionality control in Greece is exercised a posteriori. In other 
words, in Greece there is no possibility for a Court to control the 
constitutionality before the law enters into force, with the excep-
tion of the ex ante control of the Presidential Acts by the Council 
of State and of the pension bills by the Court of Audit. Never-
theless, in the Greek legal theory it was proposed by several 
scholars to introduce through a constitutional revision the con-
trol of the constitutionality before the law enters into force. This 
ex ante control should be exercised by the Highest Special 
Court (Art. 100 of the Greek Constitution) or by a new Constitu-
tional Court. Indeed, in certain areas of law (e.g. criminal law, 
tax law, electoral law) the security of law, which is very closely 
affiliated to the principle of the rule of law, is of such great im-
portance, that the ex ante constitutionality control seems to be 
much more appropriate than a posteriori control. This explains 
why an introduction of a constitutionality review before a law 
enters into force has intensified discussions among Greek legal 
scholars in the last years. 
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D. 
According to the Greek Constitution, every court has the right 
and the duty to examine the constitutionality of the law in each 
concrete case pending before it. Nevertheless and from a prac-
tical point of view, the constitutionality review is driven, through 
the courts of first and second instance and after a considerable 
period of time, to one of the highest courts (Areopag, Council of 
State or Court of Audit). 
Certainly, matters of constitutionality may arise in every field of 
law, but the vast majority of constitutional cases appear in the 
area of public law, that means while applying law provisions 
regulating the relations between the State and the citizens. 
Cases of constitutionality can also arise when constitutional 
provisions are applied in the frame of private relations, accord-
ing to the “Drittwirkungstheorie” which was elaborated in Ger-
many mainly in the field of labour law. But this is the exception. 
Most of the constitutionality matters are to be found in the field 
of public law. Keeping that in mind, it is not wrong when some 
constitutional lawyers call the Council of State a de facto con-
stitutional court. Moreover, since 2010 (Law 3900/2010), it is 
possible to drive a case which is important for a large number 
of citizens directly from the administrative Court of First In-
stance to the Council of State (the so called “pilot” process), 
thus avoiding the elapse of long periods of time during the nor-
mal procedure in order to finally come to a decision by the 
Council of State after passing through the administrative courts 
of first and second instance. 
But what happens if the same law provision is decided by two 
of the Highest Courts and these two disagree about the consti-
tutionality of the law? Such conflicts must be removed by the 
legal order and that is why in Greece a special court, the “High-
est Special Court”, exists. According to Article 100 of the Greek 
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Constitution, this court is composed by judges of all three High-
est Courts and its decisions are binding for all other courts. 
Thereby, the Highest Special Court solves conflicts between the 
other Highest Courts concerning the constitutionality of the law. 
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E. 
A further important issue which should be analyzed is the object 
of the constitutionality control. In Greece, the courts only exam-
ine the conformity of the content of the law. They exercise the 
so-called “substantial” constitutionality control, which in most 
cases refers to the violation of the fundamental rights. The 
Greek courts also examine the “external” typical features of the 
law (e.g. if the law was enacted by the parliament, signed by the 
President of the Greek Republic and published in the Official 
Journal). On the contrary and although not explicitly prohibited 
by the Constitution, they do not control the “formal” constitution-
ality of laws, “the internal” procedural aspects of the law-making 
(e.g. if the law should be enacted by the Plenary and not by a 
Section of the Parliament, if the Members of Parliament present 
were sufficient in order to achieve the necessary majority, if the 
bill contains provisions which are not relative to the main object 
of it etc.). According to the Greek jurisprudence, all these pro-
cedural aspects are part of the “interna corporis” of the Parlia-
ment and their judicial review would violate the principle of sep-
aration of powers (Art. 26 of the Greek Constitution). I belong to 
the academics who criticize this point of view, since there is no 
prohibition in the Greek Constitution to control the procedural 
aspects of the lawmaking. Moreover, the demand to safeguard 
the Constitution is not limited to the protection of fundamental 
rights. It refers to every constitutional provision, even the pro-
cedural provisions of the Constitution. The Constitution must be 
respected as a whole and not only its part which refers to fun-
damental rights. 
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F. 
Concerning the intensity of the constitutional control, the Greek 
jurisprudence accepts that the Parliament enjoys a margin of 
appreciation. That means that a law can be declared as uncon-
stitutional only if its unconstitutionality is evident (although the 
notion of “evident” itself is not evident at all!). If the judge has 
doubts about the constitutionality of a law but, on the other 
hand, its unconstitutionality is not clear, he/she will not declare 
it as unconstitutional. This way of judicial approach is compara-
ble with the so-called “verfassungskonforme Auslegung”. How-
ever and although the margin of appreciation is accepted by all 
Greek courts, there are some cases where this attitude is not 
followed in practice. In certain areas of law the constitutionality 
control is very intensive, for example in the field of environmen-
tal law. Environmental law is a quite characteristic example. For 
many years and until the appearance of the recent economic 
crisis in 2010, the control of the constitutionality in favour of the 
environmental protection (Article 24 of the Greek Constitution) 
was quite intensive and the Council of State accepted the un-
constitutionality of several law provisions. After the appearance 
of the economic crisis, when the Greek society realized the im-
portance of economic development and the need to conciliate 
economic growth with environmental protection, the jurispru-
dence of the Council of State became more moderate. 
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G. 
The consequences of a law provision being found unconstitu-
tional by a Greek court are not the same as in Germany. The 
court only refrains from applying the provision in the specific 
case pending before it, but does not remove it from the legal 
order, thus other courts may find the law constitutional and ap-
ply it. There are some cases, although rare, where courts of the 
first/second instance do not follow the jurisprudence of one of 
the three highest courts. Only if the Highest Special Court of 
Article 100 of the Constitution finds a law provision unconstitu-
tional, the relevant provision is removed from the legal order. 
This is also the reason why the relevant decisions of the Highest 
Special Court are published in the Greek Official Journal, 
although it is actually intended to publish only laws, not court 
decisions. 
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H. 
The aforesaid refers to judiciary constitutionality control in court. 
What about executive power? Do public servants have the right 
to review a law’s constitutionality? According to the legal theory 
and also to some court decisions, the administrative authorities 
have the competence to control the constitutionality of laws. 
This competence is, however, limited to “extreme” cases. Such 
an extreme case is given when the unconstitutionality is beyond 
any doubt. An unlimited right of the public servant to control a 
law’s constitutionality would cause a problem especially under 
the aspect of the security of law. 
An exception is accepted for the five independent administrative 
authorities, which are granted by our Constitution. Those are 
the data protection authority, the “Medienrat”, the “Ombuds-
man” and the authorities for the secrecy of the correspondence 
and the recruitment of the public servants. The members of 
these independent administrative authorities do not have the 
duty to follow the instructions given by the Ministers. In other 
words, they enjoy an independence which is comparable to that 
of judges. Because of this independency and their constitutional 
establishment, it is accepted that these independent adminis-
trative authorities enjoy similar rights as judges concerning con-
stitutionality control. 
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I. 
To sum up: Does the Greek system have advantages? The an-
swer to this question is definitely positive. The fact that every 
court is obliged to control the constitutionality of laws can be 
seen as a guarantee against constitutional violations. In a dem-
ocratic society in which the rule of law is applied, the possibility 
for the political power to manipulate even one court is quite re-
mote. But it is certainly impossible for a political power to ma-
nipulate all courts. 
These advantages of the Greek system of constitutionality con-
trol require that the courts are fully independent. That is the 
case in Greece where the courts are independent and the per-
sonal and functional independence of the judges is protected 
by the Greek Constitution (Articles 87 et seq.). However, the 
nomination of the presidents and vice-presidents of the three 
highest courts can be considered as problematic. They are 
nominated by the President of the Republic, but actually se-
lected by the government (Article 90 paragraph 5 of the Greek 
Constitution). Some argue that because they are nominated by 
the government, they will decide in the “hard cases” with politi-
cal relevance in favour of the government by which they were 
selected. I am not sure if that problem really exists, but this im-
pression is shared among several members of Greek society. 
Does the Greek system have disadvantages? The answer to 
this question is definitely also positive. As I have already 
pointed out, it takes a very long time until a case is decided by 
one of the highest courts and at the end (in case of disagree-
ment between them) by the Highest Special Court. This causes 
legal uncertainty and consequently damages to the rule of law. 
Of course, the recent economic crisis was a very negative evo-
lution also for the legal system, but it also gave “food for 
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thought” to legal scholars and interesting cases to the courts to 
decide. One example is the constitutionality control of the aus-
terity measures like the cut of the salaries of the public servants. 
For the “elite” of them, e.g. the judges, the policemen and army 
officers, the university professors and the doctors of the public 
hospitals, the courts decided that the measures were unconsti-
tutional. On the contrary, the cut of the salaries was not found 
unconstitutional for all other public servants. The majority of the 
austerity measures were found constitutional. Perhaps, this has 
to do with the mentality of Greek judges who are not elected by 
a political body and do not have the political legitimation of the 
judges of a constitutional court. They do not enjoy the neces-
sary political legitimation which a judge needs in order to decide 
cases of great political importance. 
Let us come to the final conclusion. Of course, in every legal 
system you can find advantages and disadvantages. Should we 
change the system of constitutionality control in Greece? My 
answer is negative, at least if we take into account as criteria 
the so-called “legal civilization” and legal tradition of the country. 
According to my point of view, tradition constitutes a very im-
portant element of a country’s identity. Greece has a very long 
tradition concerning the constitutionality control and the way the 
courts examine the constitutionality of the law provisions. Nev-
ertheless and as mentioned above, there is a very important 
deficit concerning the procedural aspects of law making, which 
are not controlled by the judiciary concerning their conformity 
with the Constitution. All procedural aspects of law making, 
which are controlled by a constitutional court like the “Bun-
desverfassungsgericht”, are not controlled in Greece. This is 
something we must change in order to safeguard the respect of 
the whole Constitution and not only part of it. 
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Annex: Greek Constitution 
1975/1986/2001/2008 
Article 87 
1. Justice shall be administered by courts composed of regular judges who 
shall enjoy functional and personal independence. 
2. In the discharge of their duties, judges shall be subject only to the Con-
stitution and the laws; in no case whatsoever shall they be obliged to com-
ply with provisions enacted in violation of the Constitution. 
 
Article 93 
4. The courts shall be bound not to apply a statute whose content is con-
trary to the Constitution. 
 
Article 100 
1. A Special Highest Court shall be established, the jurisdiction of which 
shall comprise: … 
e) Settlement of controversies on whether the content of a statute enacted 
by Parliament is contrary to the Constitution, or on the interpretation of 
provisions of such statute when conflicting judgments have been pro-
nounced by the Supreme Administrative Court, the Supreme Civil and 
Criminal Court or the Court of Audit. 
2. The Court specified in paragraph 1 shall be composed of the President 
of the Supreme Administrative Court, the President of the Supreme Civil 
and Criminal Court and the President of the Court of Audit, four Councillors 
of the Supreme Administrative Court and four members of the Supreme 
Civil and Criminal Court chosen by lot for a two-year term. The Court shall 
be presided over by the President of the Supreme Administrative Court or 
the President of the Supreme Civil and Criminal Court, according to sen-
iority. In the cases specified under sections (d) and (e) of the preceding 
paragraph, the composition of the Court shall be expanded to include two 
law professors of the law schools of the country’s universities, chosen by 
lot. 
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The constitutionality control in the 
Greek legal order – A European 
country which follows the American 
system! –
Although geographically it belongs to Europe, as far as 
the constitutionality control of the statutory provisions is concerned, 
Greece follows the American system. That means that there is no 
Constitutional Court and, on the contrary, every court (even those of 
first instance) are entitled, and indeed obliged, to control the 
constitutionality of the laws (Articles 87 par. 2 and 93 par. 4 of the 
Greek Constitution). The Greek Courts examine only the substantial and 
not the formal constitutionality of the statutory provisions. If a court 
comes to the result of the unconstitutionality, then the statutory 
provision is not annulled and removed from the legal order, but it is 
not applied by the court in the relevant court procedure. The only – 
rather rare – case where a statutory provision is erga omnes annulled is 
when this is ordered by a decision of the Highest Special Court (Article 
100 of the Greek Constitution), following a disagreement between two 
of the three highest Courts, namely between Symvoulio tis 
Epikrateias (highest Administrative Court), Areios Pagos (Cassations 
Court in Civil and Criminal procedures) and Elegtiko Synedrio (Court of 
Audit).
The presentation is going to examine the origins of the Greek system 
of the constitutionality control. It will also focus on the advantages 
and disadvantages of the Greek system and on the scientific and 
political discussion. Last but not least, the presentation will examine the 
role of the Council of State, which, although formally not a 
Constitutional Court, in practice issues the vast majority of the court 
decisions which accept the unconstitutionality of statutory provisions.
